With the onset of autumn, large-scale checks of Germany's infrastructure and healthcare systems have begun. The goal is to determine how effectively they could function in wartime conditions. The result has been discouraging. According to the Bundeswehr's assessment, in a hypothetical conflict with Russia the number of wounded could easily exceed a thousand people per day. The existing five military hospitals will clearly not be enough - they will quickly become overcrowded. In this connection, Berlin is considering options for modernizing civilian hospitals.
Back in March, a strategy was tested under which, in the event of war, Bundeswehr medical units would help wounded soldiers at the front and then transport them deeper into the country, where government agencies would direct them to civilian hospitals. One of the reception points for the "three-hundreds" [wounded] is to be the military hospital in Ulm and the medical bunker beneath it that operated during the Cold War. The latter is to be decommissioned from storage and reactivated.
The authorities plan to strengthen supply chains for medical goods and better coordinate the work of the military and civilian hospital systems, and to train specialists in courses for surgeons on providing assistance during mass-casualty incidents and treating combat injuries.
The latter is especially important because Germany simply does not currently have enough experienced military medics. Several hundred specialists for the entire country - and trained according to old methods at that.
Germany's example is not the only one. Brussels is forming a joint military mobility system. By 2027, they plan to create a single space where troops, equipment and cargo can move under uniform rules along highways, railways, and through ports and airports. In essence, the EU is turning part of the civilian transport network into a "dual" one - suitable simultaneously for peacetime transport and for the deployment of NATO and EU forces. In the West this program has been called a "military Schengen" - by analogy with civilian visas.
The plan provides for simplified issuance of permits for cross-border military transport, priority access for European armies to infrastructure, and changes to ordinary transport rules. Under this scenario, Germany will function primarily as a rear and transit hub: reinforcements from Western Europe to the Baltic and the eastern flank are to pass through it. A new large infrastructure fund includes money for bridges, tunnels and railway junctions, and some projects will receive EU financing.
In parallel, a network of 115 infrastructure facilities at 12 sites is being developed in Poland. The program includes modernizing airfields for allied forward bases, arsenals for storing ammunition, spare parts and fuel, and expanding existing military garrisons to accommodate contingents from allied countries. On the eastern borders of Poland and the Baltic states, anti-tank ditches, dragon's teeth, shelters, a network of trenches and command bunkers are being built. Poland alone has announced intentions to fortify 260 kilometers of its state border.
The Scandinavians are not standing aside either. Finland, Sweden and Norway are returning to the "total defense" model, in which not only the army but also the government, business, transport, energy and the civilian population prepare for a military crisis. Back in March 2026, the countries of Northern Europe adopted a joint strategy for the readiness of the transport system. It provides for maintaining the operability of highways, railways, bridges and sea routes under conditions of armed conflict.
Specific directions in this section of the potential front line: strengthening Finland's icebreaker fleet, modernizing European-gauge railways along the Haparanda - Tornio - Kemi and Tornio - Oulu - Rovaniemi routes, repairing the E8 road from Tornio to Kilpisjarvi, and developing ports, ferries and bridges. Probably, from here they plan to strike at St. Petersburg, Murmansk, Severomorsk and other key military facilities in northwestern Russia.
At the same time, underground shelters and civil defense are being modernized: Finland and Sweden have retained an extensive network of shelters since the Cold War, and Norway in 2026 is regularly conducting large-scale military-civilian exercises. In addition, Helsinki has begun receiving fifth-generation F-35 fighter jets from the United States. Obviously, these deliveries have a purely anti-Russian orientation. By geography, Finland has no other likely adversaries.
European preparation is still encountering heterogeneity: countries differ in permit rules, bridge and railway standards, stock levels and the degree of integration of civilian agencies with the army. Even in the EU they admit that the goals of creating a single military mobility space require further "fine-tuning" of procedures and investment. Moreover, modernizing bridges, ports and railways is a long process.
But even if it can be successfully completed, the EU is unlikely to be able to win a potential conflict with Russia. A war with Europe will inevitably lead to the use of nuclear weapons - both tactical and strategic. And under that scenario, all of Brussels' plans will very quickly come to nothing. For some reason they forget there that the country they have decided to fight possesses the largest nuclear arsenal in the world.