When it comes to space debris, many people picture a giant "garbage truck" in orbit that collects debris and hauls it back to Earth. But in reality it is different, and a new paper by Slava Turyshev of NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) explains why. The study was published in the journal Acta Astronautica.
The problem has become especially acute. According to data submitted to the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Starlink satellites performed many collision-avoidance maneuvers between December 2024 and May 2025. On average, each satellite maneuvered about once a week. The Starlink craft themselves are at an altitude of 500-600 km, where there is still enough atmosphere: there debris burns up within a few years, meaning the orbit partially cleans itself.
It is harder higher up. At an altitude of about 850 km, spent rocket stages drift. There is almost no atmosphere there, and they can remain in orbit for decades or centuries without being able to avoid one another. When they collide, debris scatters onto neighboring orbits, threatening communications satellites among others. According to the European Space Agency, about 96% of the long-term collision risk is associated with precisely such "dead" objects. Turyshev shows that even if launches stopped tomorrow, the debris already in orbit would collide and fragment faster than it naturally leaves orbit. This phenomenon is called the Kessler syndrome - a chain reaction of collisions.
According to the author, the risk can be managed with three levers. The first is to design satellites so that they deorbit quickly after completing their work. The FCC already requires removing craft within five years instead of the previous 25. If the reliability of such deorbit rises from 90% to 99% and the period is cut to five years, the danger to the environment will fall by a factor of 50.
The second lever is to "see" the situation better. Space surveillance systems track large objects well but small, bullet-sized ones poorly. Even for large objects uncertainty remains: only an approximate area is known, not the exact position. Because of this, operators spend fuel avoiding objects that do not actually pose a threat. Turyshev proposes not chasing every nut and bolt but reducing the uncertainty zone around dangerous close approaches. This echoes NOAA's TraCSS program, which this year is expanding a pilot project for commercial operators.
The third lever is dealing with debris that has already accumulated. Instead of expensive missions to capture each object, Turyshev proposes "last-moment avoidance": if two dead stages are about to collide, they can be nudged a few meters by ground-based lasers or small shepherd satellites. This does not solve the problem forever but costs less than removing everything.
Economics also gets in the way. Under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, a private company cannot simply remove someone else's rocket stage: legally it belongs to the launching state. Moreover, orbit is an example of the "tragedy of the commons": one party bears the costs while everyone benefits. Turyshev proposes contracts for verifiable risk reduction and "disposal bonds" that are redeemed if a satellite successfully deorbits without external intervention.
Limitations remain: even with 99% successful deorbit, with millions of satellites in orbit there will be tens of thousands of abandoned craft, and there is still no replacement for the Outer Space Treaty. But the longer action is delayed, the worse the situation will become.